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Commissioning and GPs: to commit[tee] or not? 
Julie E. Drake  
Abstract 
Clinical commissioning groups (CCGs), part of the National Health Service since April 2013, 
are complex organisations requiring buy-in by GPs for strategic success. CCG budgetary 
deficits and lack of sustained engagement by GPs have been reported. This article utilises 
evidence of GP experience in commissioning models to determine the factors that may 
influence engagement in the governance of CCGs by GPs, which is crucial if clinically led 
commissioning is to be part of a financially sustainable NHS. 
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Introduction 
Clinical commissioning groups (CCGs) are groups of practices responsible for 
commissioning healthcare for a population. GP commissioning has taken different forms in 
the UK (see Greener and Mannion (2008) for a review). These commissioning models began 
under the broad description of New Public Management (NPM), and are ‘experiments’ 
(Broadbent and Laughlin, 1997) with resource management implications. Osborne (2010) 
summarized NPM: taking lessons from private-sector management; the growth of hands on 
management; focus on entrepreneurial leadership; emphasis on input/output control, 
evaluation, performance management and audit; disaggregation of public services to the most 
basic unit (in the case of GP commissioning with the GP as first point of patient contact); and 
markets, competition and contracts for resource allocation. NPM and a reform agenda that 
emphasises governance structures have combined in CCGs such that the initiative impacts the 
organisation but also individuals living and contributing to policy as models are brought to 
life by the ‘actors’ who take on different roles. What would good governance look like, is GP 
involvement important and how might it be encouraged?  
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The individual role of GPs has not recently been considered in CCGs - yet so much is 
expected from GPs in commissioning and clinical leadership needs leaders. Pollitt (1993) 
recognized, “reforms did not merely alter lines on organisation charts: huge changes of role 
and skill were involved for those groups of staff concerned” (p.181). Ham (2014) has 
highlighted the importance of leaders in secondary care in acute trusts. Now consideration 
needs to be given to lead roles in primary care. Many GPs have acquired commissioning roles 
and skills, including leadership, since fundholding in 1991, and those experiences can 
provide valuable lessons that can inform policy and the future of CCGs. 
What do CCGs look like? 
CCGs have a statutorily required governing body - the board, remuneration committee and 
audit committee. The main board should include GPs from the practice area, a registered 
nurse and a specialist doctor in secondary care led by a clinical lead and an accountable 
officer. Therefore under prescribed structures some GPs have to be involved in the 
governance of CCGs. CCGs have binary accountability; statutory to the NHS Commissioning 
Board (NHSCB) and, as a membership organisation, to the practices. There is variety in the 
configuration of the board and a mix of clinical and non-clinical participants in 221 CCGs. 
For example the Accountable Officer (NHSCB, 2012) can be a clinician providing they are 
supported by an expert manager, or vice versa, and the clinical lead might be a doctor or 
nurse. With multiple GPs within practices there are limited places for GPs from individual 
practices to be involved at board level or for all practices to be represented. Individuals have 
choices about the role they volunteer for and how they shape it. Furthermore, all GPs have 
choices about the level of personal engagement with CCG responsibilities and outcomes.  
Despite an onus on clinical leads, GP representation on boards has decreased since shadow 
CCGs were formed. Less than a third of CCG boards have GPs in the majority (Kaffash and 
Money, 2014). Earlier commissioning models and NPM ‘experiments’ were associated with 
bureaucracy and, if GPs do not get involved in CCGs through committees, then imposed 
management through non-clinical leadership may ensue. This lack of engagement is not a 
new phenomenon. Doctors are reluctant and resistant to engage in management roles, as first 
reported in secondary care (for example, Dopson, 1994; 1996). Although GPs have had less 
opportunity, compared to hospital doctors, to get involved with management and governance 
of the NHS, reluctance has occurred in primary care (Cowton and Drake, 1999). Now GPs 
appear to be showing reluctance to commit to a governance role in CCGs. 
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GP engagement 
Some GPs have already been involved in committees as part of NHS governance and within 
commissioning models.  GPs were board and/or committee members in Primary Care Groups 
(PCGs) and later, as examined by Abbott et al. (2008), as part of Professional Executive 
Committees (PECs) within Primary Care Trusts (PCTs). Abbott et al. (2008) noted that GP 
engagement with committees decreased when committees “moved further away from the 
clinical workforce” (p. 304). CCGs bring governance through committees much closer to the 
clinical workforce in general practice than PCGs or PCTs did as they represent grouped 
practices bound together by a budget. However, engagement in lead, or governance roles, is 
less than hoped for. Engaged GPs have experienced no increase or decrease in their 
engagement in CCGs one year on indeed some GPs report being less ‘highly engaged’, and, 
if they were without a formal role, remained less engaged and involved (Robertson et al., 
2014).  
It is important that GPs are given, or choose, roles and become engaged in management, 
managerial decisions and committees that support the strategic direction and mission of the 
NHS. GPs are the conduit in the policy that requires general practices in CCGs to engage 
with stakeholder groups (NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement, 2011), channelling 
the patient voice, demonstrating local governance to meet the needs of the community it 
serves.  There is an inherent assumption that some GPs will get involved in governance to put 
the patient at the heart of the NHS and push the clinical perspective up through the hierarchy. 
Yet, Goldberg (2014) identified a risk that GPs will become ‘disenfranchized from 
commissioning’. It is  an apriori condition that commissioning models need to engage some 
GPs to contribute to organisational models to help address the key issues facing the 
sustainability of the NHS. Further, engaged GPs can champion commissioning so that fellow 
GPs understand more about the organisational structure they have to function within. Thus, 
engagement does matter and insight into conditions GPs favoured in past models provide 
lessons that will encourage involvement on boards and committees to facilitate ‘buy in’. This 
is increasingly important in respect of commissioning and financial management within the 
NHS at a crucial time where only one in three CCGs are confident of not being in deficit in 
2015-16 (Appleby et al., 2014). It is too early for evidence on the current model to determine 
the conditions favoured, so this paper draws on evidence from cases of GP engagement in 
earlier commissioning models. It identifies factors that will influence engagement in the 
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committees to support the strategy of clinically led commissioning. These factors are even 
more important now as GPs may be less likely to be committed this time because of the sense 
of déjà vu noted by Lapsley (2008), having been subject to successive NHS reforms. 
 
 
Cases of career in early commissioning models 
Six case studies of GPs, in a single county in England, over a 10 year period, are drawn upon. 
All  had been lead partners for their respective practices during fundholding. The participants 
were first interviewed under fundholding in 1998-1999 and later interviewed in 2009 about 
their experiences of PCGs, PCTs and Practice Based Commissioning (PBC) with a series of 
open interview questions. These past experiences revealed the factors that influenced GPs to 
adopt (or reject) non-clinical responsibility and roles. The perspective provides insight on 
how to engage some GPs in governance of CCGs. It reveals conditions that might make GPs 
satisfied with governance arrangements of the bodies to which their practice is affiliated, 
even if they choose not to be in the ‘lead’ role. It is vital to consider an engaged body of GPs 
and not a single GP or a few champions who sit on committees. There is a  shortfall in the 
number of GPs (RCGP, 2013) as more GPs are retiring with the loss of resource and 
expertise. Hence, understanding those who have experienced policies before, late career GPs, 
may mean fewer of them become disenfranchized and choose not to leave the NHS while still 
considering how GPs as a larger group will react to roles taken in commissioning models. 
Three sections follow. The first describes a typology of GPs in lead partner roles based on the 
evidence from a longitudinal panel study of six GPs. The second section examines how the 
types of GP engaged in the commissioning models subsequent to fundholding. The third 
section discusses issues from the cases that suggest the factors that may influence 
engagement in the committees of CCGs and makes recommendations for successful 
engagement. 
Commissioning pioneers: case studies and typology 
The longitudinal study began with twelve practices and concluded with six case studies of 
GPs. Practices volunteered for early commissioning for both positive and negative reasons 
(Cowton and Drake; 1999: Ennew et al.,1998) and the  enthusiasm of those taking on a lead 
role did not necessarily have a positive  correlation with the practice motivation for 
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fundholding. A typology was created based on twelve GPs characterising the different types 
of lead partner from a two-dimensional analysis of reasons for the practice going fundholding 
and the individual enthusiasm of the GP. There were three types of GP: guardian; 
opportunist; and, reluctant innovator. Table 1 shows the career status of the 6 GPs alongside 
the  ‘type’ assigned during the early commissioning model of fundholding.  
 
GP Type  Career Status as a GP  
1  Guardian  Semi-retired 
2 Opportunist  Retired 
3 Opportunist  Full-time 
4 Opportunist  Full-time 
5 Reluctant innovator  Full-time with time buy out as PCT clinical 
lead in a specialist area 
6 Reluctant Innovator  Resigned on date of interview 
Table 1 GP by type and career point 
Guardians were enthusiastic participants in commissioning focussed on the contracting, data 
and computerisation as part of the commissioning role. They sought to protect their own 
practice and its patients by improving the practice infrastructure through computerisation and 
increasing service capacity. The guardians  protected the practice facing opposition from 
fellow partners on commissioning as a policy and an overall negative set of factors for the 
practice going fundholding. The guardians used the contracting tool to manage the patient 
experience of those on their list and develop in-house services. 
On the other hand opportunists (enthusiastic GPs leading practices going fundholding for 
positive reasons) were found to be adept in using government policy, working on a macro 
scale beyond the practice. Opportunist organized schemes to develop the organization, not 
always emphasising protection of their own patients. They were often keen to influence 
primary health care beyond the practice boundary, looking at the geographical region. 
Moreover, they were found to avoid an ennui suffered on a personal level by general practice, 
being more ‘political’ in their motivation than parochial.  
A third type emerged, the reluctant innovator, who was part of a practice going fundholding 
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for negative reasons, similar to guardians, but less intent on developing/guarding the practice, 
being more outward looking. Reluctant innovators aimed, for example, to  keep the local, tiny 
hospital open and often headed up the scheme because no other person stood forward to do 
so.  
The typology is used to give insight into a range of potential GP views on participation and 
activity in governance roles, and particularly committees in CCGs. The experience of those 
GPs participating in the chronology of commissioning reveals some of the factors that both 
encouraged and discouraged engagement in the governance of commissioning units. 
 
Individual reflection on commissioning 
This section examines issues emerging from the case studies when the different types of GP 
engaged in successive commissioning models.  What was their role? What did the GPs like 
and dislike? What engaged them, or discouraged them, in representing their practices or 
motivated them to choose a committee role? The implications for CCGs are further 
considered in the third section. 
The guardian: GP1 
GP1 was involved in early PCGs, as joint chairman. He  handed over full responsibility to the 
joint Chair  who had “bundles and bundles and bundles of time… it wasn’t working as two 
people largely because I couldn’t give the commitment and I wasn’t sure of the direction”. 
The direction was described as ‘political’ with multiple agencies involved in commissioning, 
with less emphasis on individual practice aims – and patients. GP1 described the local 
Council and Social Services being involved as “pretty uninteresting”.  He did not put himself 
forward for other PCG committees seeing them as making little difference, nothing really 
happening, nor little identifiable benefit in being personally active in external relations 
between the practice and the PCG, “…couldn’t see any purpose in it”: 
... bits applied to medicine I quite liked but I’m not heavily into joined up 
management type stuff…bringing this service and that service...not what I’m good 
at. (GP1) 
GP1 did not have a role in the PCT and nor were other partners from his practice. There was 
more dissatisfaction with politics at play: 
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There was a lot of reading involved in all these things ... don’t get a buzz out of 
that, I get a buzz out of doing things I can directly see a benefit for my 
patients…some or all of them were political appointments. (GP1) 
The creation of larger boards through levels of commissioning was less successful in 
committing GP1: 
...it was such a big board (PCT) with fifteen to twenty people... very difficult to 
get a small feel to it where you got shared agreement ... an awareness that if you 
had somebody from the council, a councillor on the board, and you were saying 
something important it would get back...it wasn’t like you were having a 
conversation and saying that’s a good idea we’ll do that tomorrow [in the 
practice]...I just wasn’t enamoured with the political process I think I was 
waiting for some change...I didn’t give up for good. (GP1) 
It seems board members were courting favour with agencies aligned to primary care but little 
discussion and decision making that impacted at GP service level. GP1 was unable to exercise 
a guardian role to protect the practice and see benefit for patients. However, later, PBC did 
engage the GP as being part of the decision making process which was important to him: 
...suddenly to be involved in group with energy that’s making a big difference 
and, with a few more decisions in our favour, I think we’ll make  crucial 
difference to how care can be delivered and the sort of access of the area...it’s 
developing the organisation...I help make the decisions more rounded... (GP1) 
GP1, was able to bring the clinical and practice perspective to PBC and by being able to do 
that became engaged in commissioning for a second time with personal satisfaction. As 
commissioning decisions and outputs impacted more on the practice and its workforce the 
engagement of the guardian was sealed. 
Opportunists: GP2, GP3 and GP4 
Like GP1, GP2 wished to be involved in PCGs but realized that members were “people who 
were more interested in politics, to my way of thinking, and not those who actually 
understood hands on general practice”. He described being “generally ignored” and frustrated 
with administration and management created by non-medical staff and there was less 
opportunity for the opportunist:  
diktats that came down… the financial side of it was done by diktat not by 
agreement so that they would change the rules... rules that were arcane, were a 
little confused…It wasn’t a major problem because you know that any GP who 
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was running his own practice and had any business sense would use the system. 
(GP2) 
There was no committee participation with PCGs for opportunist GP2 and GP3. However GP3, 
after describing the period ‘as the doldrums’ did secure a place on the PEC (Professional 
Executive Committee), the role of which was to add “clinical perspectives to decisions that 
were taken elsewhere in the PCT” (p.299, Abbot et al. 2008). Like GP2, GP3 hankered after 
the proximity of commissioning to the practice benefit, particularly the data and information 
it generated :  
... frustration because you used to remember what you had achieved, what 
leverage you used to have, what you might have achieved, all the statistics you 
had… There have been changes for the better but also changes for the worse... 
eventually I thought – OK I’ll give it a go, trying again. That was the route by 
which a GP might attempt to influence the acute trust…the purchase of secondary 
care. (GP3) 
GP3 found a way to engage and influence. GP wanted more involvement at committee level 
consistent with his opportunist type  “purely for selfish reasons because I knew by being here, 
though I wouldn’t get any favours, I could drive forward policy on ‘x’”. GP2 clearly loathed 
the perceived bureaucracy. GP2 volunteered for a working party in an area of national policy 
of his own personal interest rather than directly benefiting practice and patients. Opportunists 
disliked the inability to execute original ideas and inability to get on committees: 
... somebody at the PCT whose job it was to go round and check the notice boards 
in GP’s surgery’s to make sure that they had good information on them… notice 
board monitor integrated with a another job… to make us think that we had 
representation that was meaningful but in fact I cannot remember a single 
decision that they made that was actually beneficial to us and detrimental to the 
PCT. If I wanted something I would go for it myself, and argue with the PCT. 
(GP2) 
GP3 liked to be involved with the data generated at practice level, using it use it to make a 
difference, which bodes well when GPs in CCGs can engage stakeholders to provide data for 
evidence based commissioning. GP3 became disenfranchised when “the dissenting view [his] 
wasn’t always acknowledged in the minutes and I got cheesed off” culminating in GP3’s 
pique and subsequent resignation. Notably, the fraught relationship and tensions arising from 
PECs was not unusual, for example evidenced by Abbot et al, (2008) in a study of two PCTs, 
with PECs moving away from inclusiveness of the clinical workforce, this was borne out:  
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… I became disillusioned because I thought I was just being used as a rubber 
stamp…I’m not a representative of the GPs. I was appointed by you [the PCT] 
via an interview so don’t quote me as agreeing to all these changes. (GP3) 
 
GP3 was unhappy and perceived his view to be taken as collective representation rather than 
being there for clinical perspective, nor did he approve of his view being taken as collective. 
There was little interest in a committee role within PBC and he had resigned from lead roles 
within the practice. Where once he was engaged, he became disengaged. 
Unlike GP2 and GP3, GP4, had multiple committee roles before and after his activity in 
fundholding. Some roles restricted him in taking further roles due to conflict of interest (for 
example, Non Executive Director at the Health Authority). He lamented the PCG period “not 
that it was a spent force, we just didn’t see any changes from the PCG” and he did favour 
GPs working together: 
...what we did manage to do was to actually get the GPs sufficiently united to 
form our own on call cooperative which was interesting and exciting... worked 
extremely well indeed. (GP4) 
And, the not so favoured: 
...active fundholding GPs put themselves up for election to primary care groups 
and got elected. They changed once they got the part... they got told that they had 
corporate responsibility for the decisions made by the PCG. (GP4) 
Asked to summarise what he got from PCTs, the answer again was ‘not a lot’ with him “more 
cynical”. He commented on conversion of some  GPs into PCT managers referring to one 
GP; “he’s a director not a medical GP any more”. PBC became a significant low for GP4, 
largely due to indicative rather than real budgets, although he had been enthused about it: 
We saw it probably as fundholding, more complete but without the benefits... we 
didn’t have a much freedom to move the money around. I’m the wrong person to 
speak to, my colleague was the Chairman of a large PCG he took over from me… 
I just got so peed off…the mind-set of the people [at the] PCT stonewalling. (GP4) 
 
Like GP1 and GP2, GP4 attentively observed the activity of his peers who are chosen to 
‘represent’ them in the guise of taking committee roles. GP3 was conscious of being 
held as  the consensus view holder and was troubled by it. Thus there were those who 
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had been observed as content in adopting and holding a corporate view but those taking 
a corporate view are a disappointment to some of those they represent. However the six 
GPs in this study have been experienced in the rapid  succession of changes in the  
NHS and may well be more likely to be disgruntled or disenfranchized. 
Reluctant innovators: GP5 and GP6 
GP5 began as a reluctant innovator, unenthusiastic about fundholding. As PCGs began she  
was part of the  “sort of steering committee”  but the practice shared premises with another 
practice that had a GP who decided to stand against GP5. After a split vote she found herself 
“not having much to do with it [role in PCG] after that”. She had wanted to be involved and 
seemed sad that she had not achieved personal involvement at committee level. She attributed 
a link between practice sizes and GPs getting on committees, primarily because it was one 
vote per GP, thus the larger the practice (“some very powerful practices at that time”) had 
more votes:  
They were motivated ... political animals …some practices just aren’t bothered 
and only moan when things go wrong. I wanted here to be represented because 
we serve a very deprived population…make sure our patients get a fair crack of 
the whip… if you’re not in there fighting for them sometimes it is easy to forget 
people because they are not middle class and articulate. (GP5) 
This reluctant innovator was moving towards a guardian type. GP5 demonstrates the dilemma 
faced as a GP as patient advocate when there are limitations to the degree of involvement 
imposed by different models of commissioning. Getting on committees was hard and when 
the practice was out of favour, faces ‘did not fit’ resulting in no committee involvement for 
this motivated GP5. Later GP5 was involved in steering committees and the development of a 
clinical lead role in PCTs but  “Guess what – same old!” referring to the same GPs from 
larger practices being involved at committee level.  
GP5 and GP6 contrast as GP6 presented a difficult and short interview where it emerged, after 
some resolute and stunted responses, that GP6 had resigned on the day of the interview. GP6 
also differed from GP5 in her shift to guardianship type as his lack of enthusiasm deepened in 
the era of PCGs, “... less hands on and lost controls”. He participated in a fundholding group 
alliance of similar practices that could work together during the move to PCGs but “took 
more of a back seat. I went to the meetings and sat there”.  
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Evidently another partner came along at the time and gradually took over what GP6 described 
as “that sort of role”  defined as: 
Sort of external management as opposed to internal management within the 
practice. So he’s taken over that role, he’s become a member of the LMC…goes 
to meetings with the practice manager. 
It seems this reluctant innovator was usurped by an opportunist type, though the role had not 
been clearly defined, as  a partner who had  become more externally engaged began “to take 
over more and more”. GP6 considered that the practice had “lost out” in being part of a PCG 
and that personally he got “nothing much at all, I don’t think - I got stressed”. On the 
respective roles and contribution of GPs during this time he stated that “I don’t think I can 
put anything into words really” and the tone was wry humour. 
When asked directly what sort of people got onto committees the response was a “definite 
clique of people that got on…I think I was being a bit cynical about what went on in the 
committees”. He did not assign himself to being part of that group, or clique and finally: 
When it was fundholding everything was, or everything was to do with our 
practice, was out in the open, we knew exactly where we were, we knew exactly 
what the money situation was even though it is not real money, it was sort of 
virtual money, and then it was PCTs. It sort of got vague, and now it’s even 
vaguer. (GP6) 
 
Discussion 
This section identifies issues from the cases considering how the evidence might  influence 
engagement in the governance of CCGs by GPs, broadly: not every GP can be involved; GPs 
representing GPs is a delicate matter; and, GPs become involved in, or disengaged from, 
roles in management and committees for different reasons. Therefore, individual GP 
motivation, type and perception of GPs in other roles may impact on how  harmonious binary 
accountability can be.   
Initial observations and implications 
At the simplest level, the evidence suggest that GP commitment to CCGs, through 
committees, will be stronger when roles and committee activity is closer to the clinical 
workforce, clinical activity and therefore aligned closer to GPs’ individual practice and 
patients. Some GPs do not mind working in grouped practices when they perceive clinical 
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impact but they do not like large committees (boards) that lose clinical impact which has 
implications for the size of both CCGs and constituent committees. 
Essentially, there are three kinds of GP to engage in CCGs: the representative on the board; 
those that want to represent and do not achieve the place on the board; and, those that do not 
want to represent.  It emerges that GPs like roles to be defined and responsibilities to be clear, 
including to patients,  in order to sustain engagement. The  roles defined by the NHSCB are a 
good starting point for GPs to be aware of how they might engage but there is scope for 
choice and variability in CCG roles and the mixture of clinical and non-clinical members. 
There are challenges and questions for binary accountability. For example: what roles are 
most engaging for GPs; what factors sustain engagement; and, what influences satisfaction of 
GPs without a structural role? Not only are there different roles, there  are GPs at different 
stages of career and with different experience of different commissioning models. Experience 
of commissioning may contribute to success of the CCG by helping to ensure a “governing 
body that must take account of the longer term consequences in setting business model and 
strategy” (p.5 Imison et al., 2011). However, there are multiple risks for CCGs that need 
further exploration to avoid: a politicized board that may disengage a significant proportion 
of GPs within a CCG (GP1, GP2), to the extreme of retirement (GP6); larger boards convened 
to get everybody involved but which may not be effective (GP1); too much multi-agency 
related discussion and not enough impact at primary care service level (likely to further 
disenfranchise GPs); and, risk of larger practices dominating the board (GP6). There are 
matters from the case studies that will help engagement of GPs to give more ‘clinical voice’ 
on committees but first the complexities need consideration, primarily representation and  
politicisation.  
Getting GPs on committees  
Not all GPs can sit on the main governing body within a commissioning structure and 
represent their practice and patients. Some GPs may be happy to engage at sub-committee 
level, some may have no CCG role and ‘be engaged’ if the main board is not perceived as 
overly political. The politicized board presents a risk of being a deterrent to some GPs 
engaging in  a committee role for two reasons; decisions are not congruent with the ‘in 
practice’ peer group attitude to commissioning hence the role of representing a practice is not 
attractive; and a risk of being perceived as the non-medical GP by other members of the 
profession. The need is for a stakeholder board with the GP in situ as the patients’ advocate 
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and an advocate for fellow GPs (without alienating them) and the individual practice – a 
‘guardian’. Moreover, careful selection from candidates putting themselves forward for 
appointment to the board is significant, given the geographical nature of practices within 
CCGs and the history of general practice, and GPs, in a  locality. On the one hand 
experienced GPs may be ideal but at a risk they may be classed as the ‘same old’(GP5). 
The impact of over politicisation of the board should not be underestimated as it may be 
compounded by the  issue of GPs on boards representing other GPs, that is non-board GPs. 
Politicisation impacts on non- board GPs’ perception of the board representatives’ behaviour, 
for two reasons: firstly, when decisions are remote, for example multi-agency inter-play (GP1, 
GP5) and do not have immediacy for the services at practice level the non-board GPs become 
disillusioned with committee activity; and non-board members become disillusioned with 
committee members who take a political career in commissioning. This suggests that there 
are the ‘wrong sort’ of GPs, likely the opportunist type, focussed on extraneous relationships 
that will undermine CCG success when it is measured by engaging the broader GP 
population.  The ‘wrong sort’ attached to CCGs may exacerbate feelings of déjà vu, 
bureaucracy and politics associated with PCGs and PCTs. A disengaged non-board peer 
group, for example disgruntled like GP2 and GP3, with worst case scenario the exit point of 
GP6, means large numbers of GPs may be disenfranchised. 
It seems that GPs representing GPs is a delicate matter perhaps arising from the level of 
professional autonomy and worsened by worries about being perceived as the renegade GP 
who might actually want a lead role in management or governance. GPs in this study did not 
like to be ascribed as spokesperson with ‘one GP world view’, nor do they like to see peers 
becoming a ‘non-medical GP’ as described by GP4. It seems that the collective view is a 
difficult one for GPs to take. This may be remedied with role descriptions and 
communication up and down the governance structure that is transparent and practice 
focussed. Recognising diversity of views from each practice and a growing appreciation over 
time of the clinical led roles as CCGs mature as organisations may ease issues of GPs as 
representatives. GPs in the study were troubled by being (e.g. GP3) in a representative 
position, nor did they like to be there as a rubber stamp without having their voice heard. 
Thus there are challenges in the way CCGs and committee GPs manage and communicate 
their role and activities to avoid peers perceiving them as ‘going over to the dark side of the 
corporate board’. The aim should be to avoid disenfranchising non-board GPs.  
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Despite the availability of  multiple candidates, participation in boards is falling, thus what 
type of GP should be encouraged? Guardian types are those who will contribute to make 
CCGs a success for the membership body. They are enthusiastic about policy but keep the 
patient as the focus of the reasoning behind taking a lead or committee role. Opportunists’ 
tendencies would mean more likely to engage  with policy and become political, possibly 
more corporate, with the consequence of losing the support of membership practices and 
GPs. On the other hand, reluctant innovators would not have the enthusiasm to be a strong 
board member and may simply be the rubber stamp. However, the more disenchanted GPs 
become with the board, the more likely the reluctant innovator will end up there. Lack of 
enthusiasm caused shared roles to evolve (GP6), as did competition (GP1). Joint roles do not 
seem to work in the long term (GP1 and GP6) as inevitably, one GP stands down which  
increased the number of disenfranchised GPs. 
What way forward? 
GP commitment to CCGs is a complex area with committee engagement being just one 
consideration in the success of CCGs. There are  four recommendations: firstly, careful 
attention to how GPs get ‘into office’ so that the membership engage with commissioning; 
secondly, a strong degree of impact on the board by the GP elect to be the ‘clinical voice’; 
thirdly, governance and decision making that reaches individual practice level transparently – 
to emulate the  guardian; and a GP who is seen not to be too political, nor opportunistic, who 
can represent all the practices within the CCG and not minding taking a collective view. 
These conditions will be supported by good communication of governance and will be key 
for more GPs to feel enamoured with their CCG or as one GP in the study foresaw: 
...I don’t think commissioning is going to work... I mean if you get a committee to 
design a horse you end up with a camel...everything will come down to the lowest 
denominator...if I were part of a commissioning group why the hell would I care 
if I overspend...  
This paper does not purport to include all potential views on participation and activity in 
commissioning, nor to prescribe how to get GPs to commit and engage in commissioning 
towards its success. The analysis does provides insight into GPs participating in the 
chronology of commissioning, revealing some of the factors that both encouraged and 
discouraged engagement in the governance of commissioning units. CCGs are complex 
entities that are highly accountable to the public and government with published guidance on 
good governance derived from corporate and non-corporate governance models, but they are 
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truly unique. With statutory accountability and membership accountability they must have the 
clinical voice and that means engagement of doctors, which brings a different context to 
governance. The area is fertile ground for research in appreciating governance in non- 
corporate settings to help policymakers, professional bodies and associations contextualise 
governance for success in CCGs. Further, the typology of GPs within the paper will be 
helpful in future research which should examine the views of commissioning GPs and 
examine membership structures that will provide insightful analysis of how governance in 
CCGs might be analysed, designed and be effective. 
Conclusion 
The article has reflected on the experiences of GPs in successive commissioning models, 
bringing implications for the success of CCGs and giving indications of how commitment of 
GPs can be facilitated. The CCG model has potentially good signs of achieving clinical 
engagement: real budgets with commissioning proximity to patient; data for engagement with 
stakeholder groups in the locality for evidence based commissioning; and, clinical leadership.  
Prima facie the indicators of CCG success are twofold: the level of GP engagement on 
boards; and, CCGs not in deficit.  For contribution to the financial sustainability of the NHS 
the focus should not be about GPs taking an individual lead role but how that GP link with 
governance can engage a body of GPs. Achieving GP involvement and clear communication 
will contribute to good governance. However, how GPs get to a board position may need 
some attention in terms of the rules of CCG to facilitate the right sort of GP with 
characteristics that engage other GPs within the CCG structure.   With GP engagement 
decreasing and deficits increasing, how CCGs are being governed and how they are 
structured will require monitoring and evaluation of CCGs as a sustainable model with 
emphasis on identifying good practices that provide value for money.  
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